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On behalf of spore gods. 
ALASDAIR RICHMOND 
 
This paper argues that applying ideas from (especially) general relativity can 
support interesting theses about death and its harm advanced by Roy Sorensen.  In 
particular, if we look at our own personal time through the lens of certain relativistic 
spacetimes, we find coherent models for some apparently very counter-intuitive lives, 
but lives whose possibility can nonetheless shed light on whence death gets its harm 
and that could, for all we currently know, be actual. 
Sorensen (2005) tackles death’s harm via Lewis (1976: 145) on time travel (TT): 
Inevitably, [TT] involves discrepancy between time and time.  Any traveler departs 
and then arrives at his destination; the time elapsed from departure to arrival 
(positive, or perhaps zero) is the duration of the journey.  But if he is a time 
traveler, the separation in time between departure and arrival does not equal the 
duration of the journey. 
TT discrepancies divide external time (Xt) from personal time (Pt): no TT if Pt = 
Xt; TT iff Pt ≠ Xt.  Xt tracks some suitably-inclusive reference frame outwith the 
traveller; Pt tracks everything co-moving with the traveller, (e.g. watch, memory, 
digestion, etc.).  (Cf. relativistic  or ‘proper time’: time proper to a worldline.)  Pt 
need not be ‘personal’ qua consciousness; countries, continents or planets have 
historical, geological or tectonic Pt.  Traveller identity tracks Pt and Pt ≥  0.  
Adapting Lewis, Pt and Xt share duration and direction in non-TT persistence, hence: 
Forward TT (FTT): (Pt ≠ Xt) & (Xt > 0); 
Backward TT (BTT): (Pt ≠ Xt) & (Xt  0).1 
Note: i) the claim is not that Xt or Pt alone suffice to define TT. 
ii) A journey is BTT if Xt is ever negative, i.e. not just if overall Xt is negative.2 
                                                 
1Note directional BTT inequality: you still TT if you take ‘one hour [Pt] to travel one hour [Xt] into the 
past’, (Bernstein 2015: 160).  The durations have the same magnitude but still (Pt ≠ Xt): e.g. |1| = | 1| 
yet 1  1.  Daniels (2014: 316) usefully treats such cases as involving ordering discrepancies. 
2 Lewis (1976) covers FTT and BTT, while Malament (1984: 91) covers BTT alone: “I take ‘time 
travel’ to be nothing more, and nothing less, than the act of starting at a particular point in spacetime, 
taking an otherwise conventional trip, and somehow returning to (or close to) that very point ”. 
 
 
However, Lewis makes some resistible claims.  First, Lewis (1976: 146) 
parenthetically suggests BTT includes (Pt > Xt > 0) cases.  This seems uncompelling: 
such Pt runs fast compared to Xt but stays future-directed nonetheless.  Secondly, 
Lewis (ibid.) says Xt is ‘time itself’ while Pt ‘isn’t really time, but it plays the role in 
[a traveller’s] life that time plays in the life of a common person’.  Xt is ‘genuine 
time’ to Nowacki (2006: 84).  Sorensen (2005: 122) says Pt is ‘a time-like relation 
that can govern vast portions of the universe’.   Such glosses can mislead.  Far better, 
Bernstein (2015: 160) glosses Xt as ‘time on the “normal” forward-evolving timeline’.  
Relativity knows no absolute ‘time itself’ but allows TT: duration differs between 
reference-frames but no frame is ontologically privileged.  Pt too is ‘genuine time’.  
Cf. Horwich (1975: 433) on a (500-year Xt: 15-minute ) relativistic time-journey: 
Giving up the notion of absolute time and relativizing time to frames of reference 
allows us to view the 500 years of earth-time and the 15 minutes of the proper-time 
of the time machine as equally good and correct measures of the temporal 
difference between the year 2500 and the departure of the time machine. 
Pt and Xt have frame-relative durations but are not thereby subjective, illusory or 
derivative.  Pace Lewis, non-absolute (relativistic) time allows TT: ‘The temporal 
interval that is traversed and the duration of the journey are measured in different 
frames of reference’, (Horwich 1975: 433).  While -values are absolute, 
considerations like mass-energy distribution make some -values more salient as Xt  
or Pt. Taking as Xt the  of a cosmic ray approaching Earth at 0.999 c is a possible but 
impractical choice.  For astronauts passing (e.g.) the galaxy Andromeda, time proper 
to Andromeda’s mean centre of motion is plausibly Xt.  As Andromeda moves 
relative to its local galactic cluster,3 the astronauts’ Xt is a still bigger frame’s Pt.  
Unlike duration,   and causal order are invariants.  (Causal structure and  remain 
                                                 
3Which is also ours: the Local Group, itself part of the Virgo Supercluster. 
 
 
absolute even in BTT.)  Adapting Lewis (1976) to relativity means ‘whether or not 
something is a time traveller should vary from frame to frame’, (Daniels 2014: 338). 
Sorensen claims death harms by curtailing Pt and deathlike harm can occur sans 
death.  To support these claims, he offers (2005: 123) ‘spore gods’, (past-and-future 
Pt < ; past-and-future Xt = ): 
One schedule is suggested by a temporal interpretation of the following sequence: 
... -1/16, -1/8, -1/4, 0, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, ... At the present moment, you are at the 
midpoint of your life. From this zero point, there is a Zeno sequence that goes 
forward much as before. The difference is that the quantity to be divided is the 
remaining half of your life. The other half has already been divided backwards: the 
first previous quarter of your life is preceded by the previous eighth, that eighth by 
a sixteenth, and so on. Since each part has intermissions, you have already lived 
infinitely many years. There is no time before all the moments of your life. You 
have no beginning. You have no end.4 
Nowacki (2006: 84) thinks such examples modally confused: ‘Sorensen does not tell 
us which sort of modality he has in mind … but one can bank on its being broader 
than physical possibility’.  Compare ‘The Staccato Life’ of Moore (2006: 315): 
I live normally for forty years, and these are followed by a trillion years of 
unconsciousness at the end of which everything reverts to the state that it was in at 
the beginning of that trillion-year period. I then live normally for twenty years, and 
these are followed [by] a similarly undetectable trillion-year period of 
unconsciousness. I then live normally for ten years, and these in turn are followed 
by the same thing. And so on ad infinitum. 
Nowacki (2006: 84) rightly objects that no organism on remotely human physical 
lines could survive ever-briefer state-transitions or register ever-briefer experiences.  
For any integer n, any ‘Eleatic’ spore god has arbitrarily-many past and future Pt 
increments shorter than 1/n seconds but all supposedly summing to a unified life.  (If 
the increments don’t unify, then there is no Pt-continuity and no spore god.)  
However, Nowacki (2006: 91) also queries Sorensen immortals on uncompelling 
                                                 
4Named for Nagel (1979: 8 fn. 3): ‘We could imagine discovering that people developed from 
individual spores that had existed indefinitely far in advance of their birth’, which example Nagel 
credits (ibid.) to Robert Nozick.  Sorensen’s ‘veiled immortals’ (future Xt = ,  future Pt < ) and 
‘pseudo-immortals’ (future Pt = ,  future Xt < ) will be covered elsewhere. 
 
 
metaphysical grounds, e.g. that infinite Pt accessible in finite Xt would allow 
impossible actually- infinite objects, such as circles of infinite radius: 
It is metaphysically impossible for there to exist an actually infinite circle. … By 
parity of reasoning, at least half of the spore god’s life is metaphysically 
impossible. Half of a metaphysically impossible life is no life at all. Lacking an 
extension of infinite personal time in both directions, Sorensen’s thought 
experiment fails to support his desired conclusion. 
Even setting aside Nowacki’s metaphysical concerns,5 Sorensen’s (2005) ‘Zeno’ 
spore god faces a dilemma.  Horn #1: if ‘intermissions’ disrupt Pt, traveller-identity 
fails, so the putative spore god is not one being at all but an infinite string of 
infinitely-many causally-disjoint beings whose Xt-to-Pt ratio gets ever-bigger the 
further away from now their history is traced.   Horn #2: if only consciousness ceases 
during ‘intermissions’ but other traveller-processes (e.g. digestion, cellular division, 
etc.) continue, the putative spore god is merely an ‘ordinary’ immortal, (i.e. a non-
time-traveller with Pt = Xt = ).  However, just as relativity maps Lewisian TT 
without any ontologically-privileged ‘time itself’, general relativity (GR) models 
Sorensen spore gods without Zeno intermissions. 
In special relativity’s flat spacetime, compressing one frame’s infinite duration into 
another’s finite duration requires fatally unbounded accelerations, i.e. no spore gods: 
Xt  <  iff Pt < .  However, GR allows arbitrarily-curved Malament-Hogarth (M-H) 
spacetimes, (after David Malament and Mark Hogarth).  Informally, M-H spacetimes 
let observers survey infinite-worldlines in finite .6  Below, a spacetime with ‘toy’ 
                                                 
5This discussion aims primarily to defend the coherence of Sorensen’s  spore gods within a particular 
family of (general) relativistic spacetimes.  Another discussion, about Sorensen’s pseudo- and veiled 
immortals, will try to address Nowacki’s (2006) concerns.  Gilmore (2016) offers a comprehensive 
metaphysics for Sorensen immortals but does not treat them in relativistic or (a fortiori) M-H terms.  
Gilmore also, like Sorensen (2005) and Nowacki (2006), uses Lewis’s (1976) ontology : e.g. Xt is ‘time 
itself’ and Pt is ‘not real time’ (2016: 1 and 17). 
6Formally, a spacetime manifold (M) is M-H if it contains ‘A future-directed timelike half-curve γ  M 
and a point p  M such that ∫γdτ = ∞ and γ  I 
− (p)’, (Manchak 2010: 276), where “I −” = causal past. 
 
 
M-H regions C and C’, (after Hogarth 1994: 127, Fig. 1).7  Scalar field values, which 
determine , equal 1 outside C and C’ but blow-up arbitrarily at finite distances inside 
them.  Points r and r’ are removed so field-values are nowhere actually infinite.  (No 
worldline contains r or r’.)  C and C’ are finite externally but infinite internally: each 
interior ‘appears quite small [but] is in fact as large as the complement of C’, 
(Hogarth 1994: 126).  M-H regions can have any finite external size. 
Region C, region C’ and their exterior spacetime differ metrically but comprise one 
causally-unified manifold, e.g. C frame-independently (absolutely) precedes C’.   
Worldlines and are continuous (e.g. no ‘Eleatic’ 
intermissions), timelike and have finite acceleration.    
leaves a, avoids both M-H regions and reaches b.  leaves C 
and enters C’.  For , ( < ) and (→ ) for   yet  
circumnavigates .   frame-independently precedes b: any 
-point can signal to b but b cannot signal to .  If Pt tracks 
 and Xt tracks ,  is de facto a spore god, (Pt < , Xt = ).  
While  contrives to be alive throughout all of (infinite) external time,  still suffers 
death after finite personal time, i.e. ceases at point b after a journey of finite duration 
from a.  Also,  (a fortiori) undergoes FTT, (Pt ≠  Xt; Xt > 0).  Granted, in this 
unusual scenario, a and b are (respectively) absolutely earlier and later than any Xt 
point, but this is a mere artefact of the example in the illustration and not a general M-
H feature   An alternative ‘spore god’ arena that avoids this problem is Gödel’s (1949) 
infinite ‘rotating’ BTT-supporting GR universe, wherein every point is M-H and two 
inertial observers on separate ( = ) timelike worldlines can have orthogonal time 
                                                 
7For variously more sophisticated (and realistic) M-H scenarios, see Hogarth (1994), Manchak (2010), 















axes. Again, context settles Pt / Xt choices.  If (e.g.) practically the whole physical 
universe (bar ) follows a -like mean path then ( = Xt), while ( = Xt) if 
practically everything (bar ) follows a -like mean path. 
While  has (absolutely) unbounded , it does not have infinite duration in all 
frames.  Likewise, while  has (absolutely) finite , it yet encompasses (and surveys)  
all of ’s infinite length.  But there is no paradox here: M-H cases may be an 
extremity of Pt / Xt divergence in duration (one finite and the other infinite), but 
present no logical difficulty on that account and can still share direction, (Pt > 0 and 
Xt > 0).  Explaining whence  ultimately comes (or what states it approaches at 
infinite limits) seems extremely difficult, but no more so than explaining ultimate 
states of any infinitely-descending causal chains (temporally infinite or not), (cf. 
Meyer 2012).8  That ’s state at infinite limits is unpredictable (or undetermined) is 
not contradictory. 
Lewis (1976: 149) suggests all causal chains, regardless of topology, (finite linear, 
infinite linear or finite non-linear), face an identical explanatory problem.  Where, 
ultimately, does any worldline come from?  To what, ultimately, does any object owe 
its properties, information content and casual efficacy?  Lewis says (ibid.) ‘There is 
simply no answer’.  One might reject Lewis’s ‘no answer’ view yet accept his tu 
quoque about ultimate causal explanation, e.g. think causal chains may be ultimately 
explicable but that such ultimate explanations may equally fit any causal chain.  
Imagine (for argument’s sake) a neo-Kantian who believes a) that noumenal selves 
can ‘choose’ (atemporally) empirical actualisation of whole causal chains, whether 
finite-linear, infinite-linear or finite-looped, or b) that ‘Uncertain as it may be of the 
                                                 
8Quantum mechanics may admit infinite causal descent too – see Norton (1999) or Bokulich (2003). 
 
 
real possibility of noumenal causality [generating loops], theoretical reason seems 
justified in affirming the logical possibility of the concept’, (Adams 1997: 821). 
If scepticism about spore gods must invoke physical considerations, this seemingly 
concedes that their metaphysical incoherence has not been established.  M-H 
outcomes seem highly counterfactual but appear nomologically accessible within GR.  
Indeed, while M-H outcomes seem hard to realise physically (cf. Manchak and 
Roberts 2016: 2.3), no comprehensive M-H “no-go” theorem yet exists.  (Since M-H 
outcomes involve TT, note Manchak 2011 offers a “No no-go” argument vis-à-vis 
TT.)   After surveying possible physical obstacles to M-H outcomes, Manchak (2010: 
287) concludes ‘it is not yet clear that such potential problems will turn out to prohibit 
the physical implementability of supertasks’.  (Manchak 2010 suggests seven physical 
conditions M-H spacetimes should meet and offers a model that satisfies all seven.)  
An achieved theory of quantum gravity may yet banish any physically realistic M-H 
but ‘let us proceed for now with the best available (classical) spacetime theory - GR’, 
(Wüthrich 2015: 1990).  One could read M-H outcomes as a reductio of GR, but 
given GR’s successes, this heroic course seems uncompelling. 
Sorensen’s spore gods seem metaphysically consistent, nomologically accessible 
within GR and have yet to be proven physically unrealisable.  M-H worlds provide a 
consistent framework wherein the life of an observer with finite personal time can yet 
be distributed across all of the infinite external past and future.  Hence, as Sorensen 
argues, being able to view all of (external) time need not proof you against mortality, 
even if that external time is infinite.  Even if spore gods do prove physically 
unrealisable in our world, they are sufficiently metaphysically and physically robust 
that Sorensen’s main claims stand: possible lives can extend across infinite (e.g. 
 
 
external) past and future time but still suffer mortal-like finitude of personal 
experience and thus deathlike harm.9 
Philosophy, Dugald Stewart Building, 
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